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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this case pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated §78-2a-3(2)(h).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Whether the trial court erred in dismissing Ms. Sullivan's First Complaint and
allowing her to proceed under her Second Complaint?
Standard of Review: The propriety of a motion to dismiss is a question of law and is
reviewed for correctness, giving no deference to the decision of the trial court. Krouse vs.
Bower, 2001 UT 28, 20 P.3D 895, 897 (Utah 2001).
Issue Preserved: Record p. 118, interior pages 3 (lines 9 through 21), 4 (lines 2 through
7) 6 (lines 6 through 22), 7 (lines 8 through 12), 9 (lines 20 through 25), and 10 (lines 1 through
9).
2. Whether Mark Sullivan filed his Illinois action in a timely manner?
Standard Review: The appellate court gives no deference to the trial court's legal
conclusions and reviews them for correctness. Smith Inv. Co. v. Sandy City, 958 P.2d 245, 251
(Utah App. 1998).
Issue Preserved: Record, p. 188, interior page 4 (lines 2 through 24) and interior page 15
(lines 15 through 20); Record pages 257 and 258.
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3. Whether the trial court erred in finding that Wendy Sullivan did not act surreptitiously
or wrongfully by taking the parties' children from Illinois and in not declining jurisdiction by
reason of her conduct?
Standard of Review: Issues which involve application of statutory law to the facts
present mixed questions of fact and law. Factual findings are reviewed for clear error and
conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness, giving the trial court some discretion in applying
the law to the facts. State Ex. Rel G.B., 2002 UT App 270, 53 P.3d 963, 966.
Issue Preserved: Record, p. 188, Interior 8 and 9; Record p. 256 and 257.

PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES
1. Rules 41(a)(2)(h), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
2. Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UUCCJEA), §§7845c-102(7), 110, 201(l)(a) through (d), 110, 206(l)(a), 208 and 209; Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (IUCCJA), Illinois Revised Statutes, 750-5/601, et seq., and
850-35/1, efttty

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The parties were married in August, 1995 in Albuquerque, New Mexico, and have a son,
Brett, born on April 2, 1996, and a daughter, Sydney, born July 18, 1997. The parties moved to
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Illinois in December, 1999 and were living in Thompsonville, Illinois, in June, 2002. On or
about June 26, 2002, Wendy Sullivan took the children with her to Utah to visit her family, and
according to Mark notified him on July 2, 2002 that she was not returning to Illinois and intended
to terminate the parties marriage. She filed in Utah her First Complaint for divorce on
September 26, 2002. Mark Sullivan was served with the First Complaint on or about November
27, 2002, and filed an Answer on December 27, 2002, contesting the Utah court's jurisdiction
and asserting that Illinois had jurisdiction as the home state pursuant to the UCCJEA, since the
children had lived in Illinois for more than six months before Wendy Sullivan left the state.
Wendy Sullivan filed her Second Complaint in Utah on January 28, 2003, claiming that she had
been in Utah for six months and that Utah now qualified as the home state. Mark Sullivan was
personally served the Second Complaint on March 19, 2003. Mark Sullivan thereafter filed a
custody proceeding in Illinois on April 7, 2003. When Mark Sullivan moved to consolidate the
two divorce proceedings under the earlier filed case, Wendy Sullivan objected and moved to
dismiss her First Complaint. The Utah trial court mistakenly dismissed the Wendy Sullivan's
First Complaint on May 15, 2003 before the briefing time had elapsed. Following a hearing,
however, the Court allowed the dismissal to stand, found that Mark Sullivan had waited too long
to file his complaint in Illinois, and found the Utah had jurisdiction over the matter. Mark
Sullivan appeals from the dismissal of Wendy Sullivan's First Complaint and the trial court's
holding that Utah had jurisdiction under the UCCJEA.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. The parties were married on August 26, 1995, in New Mexico, and have two minor
children, Brett Sullivan, age 8, and Sydney Sullivan, age 6. The parties and their minor children
resided in Illinois between December 1999 and June 2002. Record, pp. 201 and 202, paragraphs
2 and 5.
2. In June, 2002, Wendy Sullivan left Illinois with the children to visit family in Utah.
On July 2, 2002, Wendy notified Mark she was not returning to Illinois and intended to terminate
the parties marriage. Record at 186 pg. 5; Illinois Rule 23 Order p.l.
3. Wendy Sullivan filed her First Complaint for divorce in the Second District Court,
Farmington Department, on September 26, 2002, Civil No. 024701693DA. Record, p. 201-212.
4. Mark Sullivan was served with the First Complaint in Illinois on November 27, 2002.
Record, p. 222. He filed an Answer on December 27, 2002 (hereinafter the "First Answer")
disputing the Utah court's jurisdiction and requesting that all proceedings relating to custody of
the minor children be referred to the Circuit Court of Hamilton County, Illinois, McLeansboro,
Illinois, Record, p. 223-226.
5. Wendy Sullivan filed her Second Complaint in Utah on January 28, 2003, Civil No.
034700173. Record, pp. 1-5. The Second Complaint was served on Mark Sullivan , March 19,
2003. Record, p.9.
6. Mark Sullivan filed a Petition for Child Custody on April 7, 2003, in the Second
Judicial Circuit Court for Hamilton County, Illinois, case number 03-F-5. Record, pp. 112-116;
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pp. 245-252.
7. Mark Sullivan filed an Answer to the Petitioner's Second Complaint on April 22,
2003 (hereinafter "the Second Answer"). Record, pp. 117-120. At the same time, he also filed a
Motion to Consolidate the two divorce actions under the earlier-filed civil number pursuant to
Rule 42 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 4-107 of the Utah Rules of Judicial
Administration (now part of Rule 42), or in the alternative dismiss the later-filed complaint.
Record, pp. 232-233.
8. On or about April 29, 2003, Wendy Sullivan filed a motion to dismiss the First
Complaint and her objection to Mark Sullivan's motion to consolidate. Record, pp 234-237.
9. On or about May 2, 2003, Wendy Sullivan filed an Answer to Mark's Petition for
Child Custody in Hamilton County, Illinois, case number 03-F-5. Record, P. 194.
10. On May 15, 2003, the Utah trial court prematurely entered an order dismissing
Wendy Sullivan's First Complaint (hereinafter "the Dismissal Order"). Record, p. 253. The trial
court later concluded that the Dismissal Order was untimely. See Amended Order Denying
Respondent's Motion to Set Aside Order dismissing Petitioner's Complaint (hereinafter "the
Amended Order of Denial"). Record, p. 146, paragraph 3.
11. On May 28, 2003, Mark Sullivan filed a motion to set aside the Dismissal Order with
a supporting memorandum. Record,. Pp. 259-267.
12. A hearing was held on August 7, 2003, before the Honorable Darwin C. Hansen on
Mark Sullivan's motion to set aside the Dismissal Order and motion to consolidate Wendy
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Sullivan's two divorce cases. Record, p. 273 and p. 188 (transcript). At the conclusion of the
hearing, Judge Hansen declined to set aside the Dismissal Order because he found that Mark
Sullivan had not filed a custody proceeding in Illinois within six months of Wendy Sullivan
leaving Illinois. Judge Hansen concluded that the Utah court had jurisdiction of the custody
issues relating to the parties' minor children. Record, page 146, paragraphs 1, 2, and 3; Record p.
188, interior page 19.
13. The Utah court entered its Order Denying Respondent's Motion to Set Aside Order
Dismissing Petitioner's Complaint on September 22, 2003, Record, p. 277. Mark Sullivan's
Notice of Appeal was filed on October 22, 2003, Record, p. 148. An Amended Order Denying
Respondent's Motion to Set Aside Order Dismissing Petitioner's Complaint was entered on
October 28, 2003. Record, p. 145.
14. On December 30, 2003, Mark Sullivan filed an Emergency Petition for Temporary
Child Custody in Hamilton County, Illinois. Record, p. 163. On December 31, 2003, the Illinois
court, Honorable Barry L. Vaughan presiding, issued an Order for Temporary Child Custody
finding that Illinois was the home state of the parties' minor children at the commencement of
Wendy Sullivan's divorce action filed September 26, 2002 and that the Utah court had erred in
not staying its proceeding. The Illinois court awarded Mark Sullivan temporary custody pending
further proceedings. Record, pp. 170 and 171. The Illinois court entered a preliminary injunction
on January 5, 2004 but changed its position after a telephone conference with Judge Hansen on
January 8, 2004, and entered an order vacating the preliminary injunction. Record, p.p. 172-174.
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15. Certain Illinois court documents are not part of the Utah court file but may be
important for the Court to consider in this action and are therefore filed with the Addendum to
this Brief. They include the Rule 23 Order of the Appellate Court of Illinois, Fifth District,
entered on May 21, 2004, affirming Judge Vaughan's order setting aside the preliminary
injunction. The Illinois Appellate Court held that the Illinois action was effectively stayed
pending this Court's decision on Mark Sullivan's appeal.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court properly dismissed Wendy Sullivan's First Complaint and allowed her to
proceed with her Second Complaint. Wendy Sullivan's Second Complaint alleges additional
claims against Mark Sullivan in that Utah is now the home state of the children and Mark failed
to file a child custody proceeding in Illinois.
Mark Sullivan failed to invoke the jurisdiction of the State of Illinois to determine the
custody of the children by not filing a child custody proceeding within six (6) months of the
children moving to Utah in June, 2002.
By the time Mark Sullivan finally filed for custody in the State of Illinois on April 7,
2003, he knew (a) it had been more than six months since his wife had notified him of her intent
to remain in Utah; (b) the children had been living with his wife in the State of Utah in excess of
six months; and (c) more importantly, that a proceeding for child custody was pending in the
-7-

State of Utah.
Utah Code Annotated, §78-45c-206(l) as well as UCCJEA adopted by the State of
Illinois, precludes Illinois from exercising jurisdiction because at the time of the commencement
of the Illinois proceeding filed on April 7, 2003, a proceeding concerning custody of the children
had been previously filed on January 28, 2003 in the State of Utah in a court having jurisdiction
substantially in conformity with the UCCJEA and because Utah was the home state of the
children.

ARGUMENT
I

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN
DISMISSING WENDY SULLIVAN'S FIRST
COMPLAINT AND IN ALLOWING HER TO
PROCEED WITH HER SECOND COMPLAINT

Wendy Sullivan filed her First Complaint for divorce and for custody of the children in
Utah on September 26, 2002. Under the First Complaint it is clear Utah did not have jurisdiction
to determine custody under the UCCJEA because the children had not resided in the state of Utah
for at least six (6) months prior to the commencement of the action. §78-45c-201(l) U.C.A.
On the other hand, it is clear under the Second Complaint Utah does have jurisdiction to
determine custody. Under the UCCJEA, Utah has become the home state of the children.
Wendy, in her Second Complaint, alleged Utah was the home state of the children and that no
child custody proceedings had been filed in Illinois, Record at pg. 2.
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Pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Wendy Sullivan, moved the
trial court to dismiss her First Complaint. Record, p. 236. Mark Sullivan had filed an Answer
but no counterclaim. Record, p. 223. In his Answer filed December 27, 2002, Mark asked the
First Complaint be dismissed and that all custody proceedings be referred to Illinois. However,
by December 27, 2002, Mark had not filed any child custody proceeding in Illinois permitting an
Illinois court to invoke jurisdiction. The trial court granted Wendy Sullivan's motion to dismiss
her First Complaint as Mark Sullivan had only answered and had not filed a counterclaim.
Wendy Sullivan's Second Complaint alleges additional claims against Mark Sullivan not
found in the First Complaint as more than six months had elapsed since the children had resided
in Utah with their mother and Mark had failed to file a child custody proceeding in Illinois.
Under Mark's interpretation of the UCCJEA, Wendy would be forever time barred from
filing for custody in Utah because her First Complaint was filed within six months of relocating
to Utah with the children. Because more than six months had elapsed since Wendy moved to
Utah and Mark had failed to invoke the jurisdiction of Illinois Wendy was entitled to file a
Second Complaint to assert additional rights given to her under the UCCJEA. However, Mark
should only be given six months from when Wendy and the children moved to Utah to protect his
rights under the UCCJEA.
A. UTAH HAS JURISDICTION UNDER THE UCCJEA.
Utah is the proper state to assert jurisdiction concerning custody of the children in this
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case pursuant to §78-45c-206(l) U.C.A. Illinois should be prohibited from exercising
jurisdiction concerning custody because a child custody proceeding had already been commenced
by Wendy Sullivan on January 28, 2003 after the children had resided with her for more than six
months in the State of Utah. Mark filed a Petition for Child Custody on April 7, 2003 in Illinois
and referred only to the First Complaint filed by Wendy on September 26, 2002 and failed to
advise the Illinois Court of the Second Complaint filed on January 28, 2003 contrary to the
requirements of §78-45c-209(l). Specifically Mark failed to advise the Illinois Court in his
Petition filed on April 7, 2003 of Wendy's Second Complaint filed on January 28, 2003 and that
Mark had been served with the Second Complaint on March 19, 2003. Record, p. 112. This
important fact was clarified with the Illinois Court during the telephone conference between
Judge Hansen and Judge Vaughn on January 8, 2004.
Utah Code Annotated, §78-45c-206 concerned with simultaneous proceedings, states:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in §78-45c-204, a court
of this state may not exercise its jurisdiction under this
chapter if at the time of the commencement of the
proceeding a proceeding concerning the custody of the
child had been previously commenced in a court of
another state having jurisdiction substantially in conformity with this chapter, unless the proceeding has
been terminated or is stayed by the court of the other
state because a court of this state is a more convenient
forum under §78-45c-207.
(2) Except as otherwise provided in §78-45c-204, a court of
this state, before hearing a child custody proceeding shall
examine the court documents and other information supplied
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by the parties pursuant to §78-45c-209. If the court determines
that a child custody proceeding was previously commenced in a
court in another state having jurisdiction substantially in accordance
with this chapter, the court of this state shall stay its proceeding
and communicate with the court of the other state. If the court
of the state having jurisdiction substantially in accordance with
this chapter does not determine that the court of this state is a
more appropriate forum, the court of this state shall dismiss the
proceeding.
(3) In a proceeding to modify a child custody determination, a
court of this state shall determine whether a proceeding to
enforce the determination has been commenced in another
state. If a proceeding to enforce a child custody determination
has been commenced in another state, the court may:
(a) stay the proceeding for modification pending the
entry of an order of a court of the other state
enforcing, staying, denying, or dismissing the
proceeding for enforcement;
(b) enjoin the parties from continuing with the proceeding
for enforcement; or
(c) proceed with the modification under conditions it
considers appropriate;
Wendy having filed a child custody proceeding in Utah on January 28, 2003 after residing
in Utah with the children for more than six months and serving Mark with the Second Complaint
before he filed in Illinois should prevent the State of Illinois from exercising jurisdiction pursuant
to§206oftheUCCJEA.
B. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED NOT TO CONSOLIDATE
THE TWO DIVORCE CASES AND DISMISSED THE INITIAL CASE.
The trial court correctly ruled it would not consolidate the two cases and properly granted
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Ms. Sullivan's Motion to Dismiss her First Complaint. The First and Second Complaint should
not be consolidated because they involve a different interpretation and application of the
UCCJEA.
Under the First Complaint, Utah would not have jurisdiction to determine custody as it
was not the home state of the children. However, it is clear under the Second Complaint, Utah
has jurisdiction to determine custody as it has become the home state of the children and also
because Mark Sullivan had failed to file in Illinois invoking the jurisdiction of the Illinois Court.
Mark argues for consolidation of the two cases but cites no authority prohibiting Wendy
Sullivan from filing a second proceeding in Utah especially when by the lapse of time Wendy
acquires greater rights under the UCCJEA. Consolidation is not a proper remedy if it violates
statutory provisions or would be prejudicial to a party. See Raggenbuck vs. Suhrmann, 7 Utah 2d
327, 325 P.2d 258 (1958). In this case consolidating the two cases would violate statutory
interpretation of the UCCJEA and be prejudicial to Wendy Sullivan regarding which state has
jurisdiction to determine custody as between the filing of the First Complaint and the Second
Complaint. Consolidation would be improper and prejudicial to Wendy Sullivan because there is
a distinct difference in application of the UCCJEA in determining jurisdiction.

Severance is

within the sound discretion of the trial court and absence abuse of such discretion will not be
upset on appeal. King vs. Barron. 770 P.2d 975 (Utah 1988).
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II

MARK SULLIVAN DID NOT FILE HIS
CUSTODY ACTION IN A TIMELY MANNER

Mark Sullivan filed a Petition for Child Custody on April 7, 2003 in Hamilton County,
Illinois. Mark was served on March 19, 2003 with Wendy's Second Complaint. It is submitted
that Mark only filed his action for custody on April 7, 2003 as he knew Utah would undoubtedly
assume jurisdiction to determine custody unless he filed an action in the State of Illinois. Mark
had demonstrated no interest in obtaining custody of the children until he was forced to choose
between relinquishing custody or filing for custody in Illinois. It is further submitted Mark had
failed to support his children in any respect after they moved to Utah and was content to maintain
the status quo until he was served with the Second Complaint.
In this case, Mark forfeited any right he may have had under the UCCJEA that the State
of Illinois be considered to have exclusive jurisdiction to determine custody of the children. Utah
became the home state of the children on December 26, 2002, six months after Wendy moved to
Utah because Mark failed to file a child custody proceeding in Illinois.
Was Mark prejudiced by Wendy filing a Second Complaint and moving to dismiss her
First Complaint? No, just the opposite. The initial filing by Wendy gave notice to Mark of her
intent to obtain a divorce and that she was seeking custody of the children. It gave Mark notice
that he should do what he knew he must do if he wanted custody of his children; i.e., file for
custody in Illinois before the six month period lapsed. Mark was not precluded from filing in
Illinois after he was served with the First Complaint but he chose not to exercise his remedies
under the UCCJEA adopted in Utah and Illinois.
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A. MARK SULLIVAN'S DELAY IN FILING IN ILLINOIS
CONFERS JURISDICTION UPON UTAH.
Mark's filing his Petition for Child Custody in Illinois on April 7, 2004 is untimely under
§78-45c-206(l) concerned with simultaneous proceedings in different states. Illinois should be
prohibited from exercising jurisdiction as there was a child custody proceeding already filed by
Wendy in Utah on January 28, 2003.
In Osborne v. Adoption Center of Choice, 70 P.3rd 58, 68 (Utah 2003), a North Carolina
father challenged the adoption of his son in adoption proceedings held in Utah. In this case,
Supreme Court Justice Christine Durham discussed the UCCJEA and especially §78-45c-206 as
to conflicts between North Carolina and Utah over the adoption proceeding.
Citing §78-45c-201(l) Justice Durham stated,
The UCCJEA gives a Utah Court jurisdiction to make
an initial child custody determination only if (1) Utah
is the child's home state on the date the proceeding begins,
(2) a court of another state does not have jurisdiction or is
not a more appropriate forum, (3) all other courts that might
have jurisdiction under the proceeding provision have declined
to exercise it, or (4) no state would otherwise have jurisdiction.
As to simultaneous proceedings involving child custody proceedings, Justice Durham
elaborated:
The UCCJEA has a provision that explicitly governs a
situation where two courts in different states have initiated
potentially conflicting proceedings regarding a birth parent's
parental rights and the custody of a child. See Utah Code Ann.
§78-45c-206. See 70 P.3rd at 69.
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In this case, Utah is the appropriate state to exercise child custody jurisdiction because (1)
Utah is the home state of the children; (2) Illinois is no longer the home state because Mark
Sullivan failed to file a child custody proceeding with six months of the children moving to Utah;
(3) the children and Wendy Sullivan have a significant connection with the State of Utah; (4)
there is substantial evidence in the state of Utah concerning the children's care, protection,
training, and personal relationships; (5) Illinois has not asserted jurisdiction because of
inconvenient forum or because of unjustifiable conduct; and (6) Wendy was the first to file after
Utah became the home state.
Similarly in Gestl v. Frederick, 754 A.2d 1087, (Maryland 2000) the Maryland Court of
Appeals held if a child custody proceeding is pending in another jurisdiction, a Maryland Court
must usually decline to exercise its jurisdiction under the UCCJEA.
B. WENDY SULLIVAN'S ABSENCE FROM ILLINOIS SHOULD
NOT HAVE BEEN INCLUDED IN CALCULATING THE SIX
MONTH PERIOD OF RESIDENCE.

Mark claims Wendy told him repeatedly that she was only visiting Utah temporarily and
that she was planning to return with the children to Illinois. However, that allegation is not
supported by reference to any reliable record. Mark's Statement of Facts refers to allegations set
forth in his Answer, not to any sworn testimony. The only other reference cited by Mark was
during proffer to the trial court at the August 7, 2003 hearing.
It should be noted that on page 1 of the Illinois Rule 23 Order, attached as an Addendum
to Mark's brief, the Appellate Court of Illinois Fifth District recited that in June, 2002 Wendy
took the children to Utah to visit her family, and according to Mark, she notified him on July 2,
-15-

2002 that she was not returning to Illinois, and intended to terminate the parties' marriage.
The record should reflect on August 7, 2003, hearing before District Judge Darwin C.
Hansen, R at 188, p. 13, and found on interior page 13, Wendy's counsel offered to have Wendy
sworn and testify under what circumstances she left the state of Illinois, and about communication between she and Mark. Mark's counsel declined to have her testify even though Judge
Hansen ruled he would leave it up to Mark's counsel to have her testify.
III. WENDY SULLIVAN DID NOT TAKE THE CHILDREN
FROM ILLINOIS UNDER FALSE PRETENSES.
One again, this issue raised by Mark should be stricken as Mark claims Wendy repeatedly
represented to him she would be returning with the children to Illinois but there is no reference to
any reliable record as to that alleged fact. Mark's Answer does not constitute a reliable record to
support his self serving position.
At the hearing of August 7, 2003 before District Court Judge, Darwin C. Hansen, Record
at 188, p. 5-6, Judge Hansen asked Mark's counsel when did Wendy advise Mark she was going
to stay in Utah and not go back to Illinois. Mark's attorney responded "sometime in July", (pg.
5,6).
This response by Mark's counsel is consistent with the Illinois Rule 23 Order stating
Wendy told Mark on July 2 that she was not returning to Illinois and intended to terminate the
marriage.
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CONCLUSION
Wendy Sullivan's filing of her Second Complaint for divorce and custody was
appropriate considering the First Complaint was dismissed by the trial court and because Utah
became the home state of the children permitting it to exercise jurisdiction over custody of the
children. Utah, not Illinois, is the home state of the children and the correct state to exercise
jurisdiction over custody pursuant to §78-45c-206 U.C.A. as there was commenced in Utah a
child custody proceeding before one was filed in the state of Illinois. The Court should not
consider Mark Sullivan's claim that Wendy Sullivan's absence from Illinois was temporary or
she left Illinois under false pretenses as not supported by a reliable record.
DATED this J ^4ay of August, 2004.

ROBERT L. NEELEY
J
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellee
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
WENDY SULLIVAN,
Petitioner/Appellee

)

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

)

Appellate Case No. 20030957-CA

vs.

MARK ALLEN SULLIVAN,
Respondent/Appellant

APPEAL FROM THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT, DAVIS COUNTY
JUDGE DARWIN C. HANSEN

I, Robert L. Neeley, certify that on August / ^ _ r 2004,1 served two copies of the attached
Brief of Appellee by mailing to Thomas R. King, Attorney at Law, 648 East 100 South, Suite
200, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 by first class mail.
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ADDENDUM

vi

807

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

R u l e 40. A s s i g n m e n t of c a s e s for trial; c o n t i n u a n c e .

Rule 44

(a) Order and precedence. The district courts shall provide
by rule for the placing of actions upon the trial calendar (1)
without request of the parties or (2) upon request of a party
and notice to the other parties or (3) in such other manner as
the courts may deem expedient. Precedence shall be given to
actions entitled thereto by statute.
(b) Postponement of the trial. Upon motion of a party, the
court may in its discretion, and upon such terms as may be
just, including the payment of costs occasioned by such postponement, postpone a trial or proceeding upon good cause
shown. If the motion is made upon the ground of the absence
of evidence, such motion shall also set forth the materiality of
the evidence expected to be obtained and shall show t h a t due
diligence has been used to procure it. The court may also
require the party seeking the continuance to state, upon
affidavit or under oath, the evidence he expects to obtain, and
if the adverse party thereupon admits t h a t such evidence
would be given, and that it may be considered as actually
given on the trial, or offered and excluded as improper, the
trial shall not be postponed upon that ground.
(c) Taking testimony of witnesses present. If required by the
adverse party, the court shall, as a condition to such postponement, proceed to have the testimony of any witness present
taken, in t h e same manner as if at the trial; and the testimony
so taken may be read on the trial with the same effect, and
subject to the same objections t h a t may be made with respect
to a deposition under the provisions of Rule 32(c)(3)(A) and
(B).

until the close of all the evidence. If the court renders
judgment on the merits against the plaintiff, the court shall
make findings as provided in Rule 52(a). Unless the court in
its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under
this subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this
rule, other t h a n a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for
improper venue or for lack of an indispensable party, operates
as an adjudication upon the merits.
(c) Dismissal of counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party
claim. The provisions of this rule apply to the dismissal of any
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim. A voluntary
dismissal by the claimant alone p u r s u a n t to Paragraph (1) of
Subdivision (a) of this rule shall be made before a responsive
pleading is served or, if there is none, before the introduction
of evidence at the trial or hearing.
(d) Costs of previously-dismissed
action. If a plaintiff who
h a s once dismissed an action in any court commences an
action based upon or including the same claim against the
same defendant, the court may make such order for the
payment of costs of the action previously dismissed as it may
deem proper and may stay the proceedings in the action until
the plaintiff has complied with the order.
(e) Bond or undertaking to be delivered to adverse party.
Should a party dismiss his complaint, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim, pursuant to Subdivision (a)(l)(i)
above, after a provisional remedy h a s been allowed such party,
t h e bond or undertaking filed in support of such provisional
remedy m u s t thereupon be delivered by the court to the
adverse party against whom such provisional remedy was
obtained.

Rule 41. D i s m i s s a l of actions.

R u l e 42. Consolidation; separate trials.

(a) Voluntary dismissal; effect thereof.
(a)(1) By plaintiff. Subject to the provisions of Rule 23(e), of
Rule 66(i), and of any applicable statute, an action may be
dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court by filing a
notice of dismissal at any time before service by the adverse
party of an answer or other response to the complaint permitted under these rules. Unless otherwise stated in the notice of
dismissal, the dismissal is without prejudice, except t h a t a
notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the
merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any
court of the United States or of any state an action based on or
including t h e same claim.
(a)(2) By order of court Unless the plaintiff timely files a
notice of dismissal under paragraph (1) of this subdivision of
this rule, an action may only be dismissed at the request of the
plaintiff on order of the court based either on:
(a)(2)(i) a stipulation of all of the parties who have appeared in the action; or
(a)(2)(ii) upon such terms and conditions as the court deems
proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant
prior to t h e service upon him of the plaintiff's motion to
dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed against the defendant's objection unless the counterclaim can remain pending
for independent adjudication by the court. Unless otherwise
specified in the order, a dismissal under this paragraph is
without prejudice.
(b) Involuntary dismissal; effect thereof. For failure of the
plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any
order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action
or of any claim against him. After the plaintiff, in an action
tried by the court without a jury, has completed the presentation of his evidence the defendant, without waiving his right to
offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may
move for a dismissal on the ground t h a t upon t h e facts and the
law t h e plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The court as trier
of the facts may then determine t h e m and render judgment
against the plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment

(a) Consolidation. When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a
joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the
actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may
make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend
to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.
(b) Separate trials. The court in furtherance of convenience
or to avoid prejudice may order a separate trial of any claim,
cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim, or of any
separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims,
counterclaims, third-party claims, or issues.
R u l e 43. E v i d e n c e .
(a) Form. In all trials, the testimony of witnesses shall be
taken orally in open court, unless otherwise provided by these
rules, the U t a h Rules of Evidence, or a statute of this state. All
evidence shall be admitted which is admissible under the
U t a h Rules of Evidence or other rules adopted by the Supreme
Court.
(b) Evidence on motions. When a motion is based on facts
not appearing of record the court may hear the matter on
affidavits presented by the respective parties, but the court
may direct t h a t the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral
testimony or depositions.
R u l e 44. P r o o f of official record.
(a) Authentication
of copy. An official record or an entry
therein, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced
by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the
officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy,
and in the absence of judicial knowledge or competent evidence, accompanied with a certificate t h a t such officer has the
custody. If t h e office in which the record is kept is within the
United States or within a territory or insular possession
subject to t h e dominion of the United States, the certificate
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ping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 USCS
§ 1738A(c)(2)(A), 6 A.L.R.5th 1.
Significant connection jurisdiction of court to
modify foreign child custody decree under
§§ 3(a)(2) and 14(b) of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) and t h e Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28
U.S.C.A. §§ 1738A(c)(2)(b) and 1738A(f)(l), 67
A.L.R.5th 1.
Home state jurisdiction of court to modify
foreign child custody decree under §§ 3(a)(1)
and 14(a)(2) of Uniform Child Custody Juris-

78-45c-102.

diction Act (UCCJA) and Parental Kidnapping
Prevention
Act
(PKPA),
28
U.S.C.A.
§§ 1738A(c)(2)(A)
and
1738A(f)(l),
72
A.L.R.5th 249.
Declining jurisdiction to modify prior child
custody decree under § 14(a)(1) of Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) and
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA)
28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(f)(2), 73 A.L.R.5th 185. '
Appealability of interlocutory or pendente
lite order for temporary child custody, 82
A.L.R.5th 389.

Definitions.

As used in this chapter:
(1) "Abandoned" means left without provision for reasonable and necessary care or supervision.
(2) "Child" means an individual under 18 years of age and not married.
(3) "Child custody determination" means a judgment, decree, or other
order of a court providing for the legal custody, physical custody, or
parent-time with respect to a child. The term includes a permanent,
temporary, initial, and modification order. The term does not include an
order relating to child support or other monetary obligation of an individual.
(4) "Child custody proceeding" means a proceeding in which legal
custody, physical custody, or parent-time with respect to a child is an issue.
The term includes a proceeding for divorce, separation, neglect, abuse,
dependency, guardianship, paternity, termination of parental rights, and
protection from domestic violence, in which the issue may appear. The
term does not include a proceeding involving juvenile delinquency, contractual emancipation, or enforcement under Part 3, Enforcement.
(5) "Commencement" means the filing of the first pleading in a proceeding.
(6) "Court" means an entity authorized under the law of a state to
establish, enforce, or modify a child custody determination.
(7) "Home state" means the state in which a child lived with a parent or
a person acting as a parent for at least six consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding. In the case
of a child less than six months of age, the term means the state in which
the child lived from birth with any of the persons mentioned. A period of
temporary absence of any of the mentioned persons is part of the period.
(8) "Initial determination" means the first child custody determination
concerning a particular child.
(9) "Issuing court" means the court that makes a child custody determination for which enforcement is sought under this chapter.
(10) "Issuing state" means the state in which a child custody determination is made.
(11) "Modification" means a child custody determination that changes,
replaces, supersedes, or is otherwise made after a previous determination
concerning the same child, whether or not it is made by the court that
made the previous determination.
(12) "Person" includes government, governmental subdivision, agency,
or instrumentality, or any other legal or commercial entity.
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(13) "Person acting as a parent" means a person, other than a parent,
who:
(a) has physical custody of the child or has had physical custody for
a period of six consecutive months, including any temporary absence,
within one year immediately before the commencement of a child
custody proceeding; and
(b) has been awarded legal custody by a court or claims a right to
legal custody under the law of this state.
(14) "Physical custody" means the physical care and supervision of a
child.
(15) "State" means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, or any territory or
insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
(16) "Tribe" means an Indian tribe, or band, or Alaskan Native village
which is recognized by federal law or formally acknowledged by a state.
(17) 'Writ of assistance" means an order issued by a court authorizing
law enforcement officers to take physical custody of a child.
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-102, enacted by
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 2; 2001, ch. 255, § 36.
Amendment Notes. — The 2001 amendment, effective April 30, 2001, substituted "par-

ent-time" for 'Visitation" in Subsections (3) and
(4).
Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch. 247,
§ 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Custody proceeding.
Voluntary termination of adoptive father's
parental rights in, and obligations to, child was

not custody issue under this chapter. T.B. v.
M.M.J., 908 R2d 345 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — What types of proceedings or determinations are governed by the Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCC JA) or the

Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA),
78 A.L.R.4th 1028.

78-45c-103. Proceedings governed by other law.
This chapter does not govern:
(1) an adoption proceeding; or
(2) a proceeding pertaining to the authorization of emergency medical
care for a child.
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-103, enacted by
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 3.

Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch. 247,
§ 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000.

78-45c-104. Application to Indian tribes.
(1) A child custody proceeding that pertains to an Indian child as defined in
the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq., is not subject to this
chapter to the extent that it is governed by the Indian Child Welfare Act.
(2) A court of this state shall treat a tribe as a state of the United States for
purposes of Part 1, General Provisions, and Part 2, Jurisdiction.
(3) A child custody determination made by a tribe under factual circumstances in substantial conformity with the jurisdictional standards of this
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shall be given in a manner reasonably calculated to give actual notice, but may
be by publication if other means are not effective.
(2) Proof of service may be made in the manner prescribed by the law of this
state or by the law of the state in which the service is made.
(3) Notice is not required for the exercise of jurisdiction with respect to a
person who submits to the jurisdiction of the court.
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-108, enacted by
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 8.
Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch. 247,

§ 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000.
Cross-References. — Service of process,
Rule 4, U.R.C.P.

78-45c-109. Appearance and limited immunity.
(1) A party to a child custody proceeding who is not subject to personal
jurisdiction in this state and is a responding party under Part 2, Jurisdiction,
a party in a proceeding to modify a child custody determination under Part 2,
Jurisdiction, or a petitioner in a proceeding to enforce or register a child
custody determination under Part 3, Enforcement, may appear and participate
in the proceeding without submitting to personal jurisdiction over the party for
another proceeding or purpose.
(2) A party is not subject to personal jurisdiction in this state solely by being
physically present for the purpose of participating in a proceeding under this
chapter. If a party is subject to personal jurisdiction in this state on a basis
other than physical presence, the party may be served with process in this
state. If a party present in this state is subject to the jurisdiction of another
state, service of process allowable under the laws of that state may be
accomplished in this state.
(3) The immunity granted by this section does not extend to civil litigation
based on acts unrelated to the participation in a proceeding under this chapter
committed by an individual while present in this state.
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-109, enacted by
L< 2000, ch. 247, § 9.

Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch. 247,
§ 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000.

78-45c-110. Communication between courts.
(1) A court of this state may communicate with a court in another state
concerning a proceeding arising under this chapter.
(2) The court may allow the parties to participate in the communication. If
the parties are not able to participate in the communication, the parties shall
be given the opportunity to present facts and legal arguments before a decision
on jurisdiction is made.
(3) A communication between courts on schedules, calendars, court records,
and similar matters may occur without informing the parties. A record need
not be made of that communication.
(4) Except as provided in Subsection (3), a record shall be made of the
communication. The parties shall be informed promptly of the communication
and granted access to the record.
(5) For the purposes of this section, "record" means information that is
inscribed on a tangible medium or that which is stored in an electronic or other
medium and is retrievable in perceivable form. A record includes notes or
transcripts of a court reporter who listened to a conference call between the
courts, an electronic recording of a telephone call, a memorandum or an
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electronic record of the communication between the courts, or a memorandum
or an electronic record made by a court after the communication.
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-110, enacted by
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 10.

78-45c-lll.

Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch. 247,
§ 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000.

Taking testimony in another state.

(1) In addition to other procedures available to a party, a party to a child
custody proceeding may offer testimony of witnesses who are located in
another state, including testimony of the parties and the child, by deposition or
other means allowable in this state for testimony taken in another state. The
court on its own motion may order that the testimony of a person be taken in
another state and may prescribe the manner in which and the terms upon
which the testimony is taken.
(2) A court of this state may permit an individual residing in another state
to be deposed or to testify by telephone, audiovisual means, or other electronic
means before a designated court or at another location in that state. A court of
this state shall cooperate with courts of other states in designating an
appropriate location for the deposition or testimony.
(3) Documentary evidence transmitted from another state to a court of this
state by technological means that do not produce an original writing may not
be excluded from evidence on an objection based on the means of transmission.
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-lll, enacted by
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 11.

Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch. 247,
§ 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000.

78-45c-112. Cooperation between courts — Preservation
of records,
(1) A court of this state may request the appropriate court of another state
to:
(a) hold an evidentiary hearing;
(b) order a person to produce or give evidence under procedures of that
state;
(c) order that an evaluation be made with respect to the custody of a
child involved in a pending proceeding;
(d) forward to the court of this state a certified copy of the transcript of
the record of the hearing, the evidence otherwise presented, and any
evaluation prepared in compliance with the request; and
(e) order a party to a child custody proceeding or any person having
physical custody of the child to appear in the proceeding with or without
the child.
(2) Upon request of a court of another state, a court of this state may:
(a) hold a hearing or enter an order described in Subsection (1); or
(b) order a person in this state to appear alone or with the child in a
custody proceeding in another state.
(3) A court of this state may condition compliance with a request under
Subsection (2)(b) upon assurance by the other state that travel and other
necessary expenses will be advanced or reimbursed. If the person who has
physical custody of the child cannot be served or fails to obey the order, or it
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appears the order will be ineffective, the court may issue a warrant of arrest
against the person to secure his appearance with the child in the other state.
(4) Travel and other necessary and reasonable expenses incurred under
Subsections (1) and (2) may be assessed against the parties according to the
law of this state.
(5) A court of this state shall preserve the pleadings, orders, decrees, records
of hearings, evaluations, and other pertinent records with respect to a child
custody proceeding until the child attains 18 years of age. Upon appropriate
request by a court or law enforcement official of another state, the court shall
forward a certified copy of these records.
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-112, enacted by
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 12.

Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch. 247,
§ 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000.

PART 2
JURISDICTION
78-45c-201. Initial child custody jurisdiction.
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Section 78-45c~204, a court of this state
has jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination only if:
(a) this state is the home state of the child on the date of the
commencement of the proceeding, or was the home state of the child
within six months before the commencement of the proceeding and the
child is absent from this state but a parent or person acting as a parent
continues to live in this state;
(b) a court of another state does not have jurisdiction under Subsection
(l)(a), or a court of the home state of the child has declined to exercise
jurisdiction on the ground that this state is the more appropriate forum
under Section 78-45c-207 or 78-45c-208; and
(i) the child and the child's parents, or the child and at least one
parent or a person acting as a parent have a significant connection
with this state other than mere physical presence; and
(ii) substantial evidence is available in this state concerning the
child's care, protection, training, and personal relationships;
(c) all courts having jurisdiction under Subsection (l)(a) or (b) have
declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that a court of this state is
the more appropriate forum to determine the custody of the child under
Section 78-45c-207 or 78-45c-208; or
(d) no state would have jurisdiction under Subsection (l)(a), (b), or (c).
(2) Subsection (1) is the exclusive jurisdictional basis for making a child
custody determination by a court of this state.
(3) Physical presence of, or personal jurisdiction over, a party or a child is
neither necessary nor sufficient to make a child custody determination.
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-201, enacted by
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 13.

Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch. 247,
§ 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000.
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(3) The obligation to join a party and the right to intervene as a party in a
child custody proceeding under this chapter are governed by the law of this
state as in child custody proceedings between residents of this state.
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-205, enacted by
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 17.

Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch. 247,
§ 42 m a k e s the act effective on July 1, 2000.

78-45c-206. Simultaneous proceedings.
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Section 78-45c-204, a court of this state
may not exercise its jurisdiction under this chapter if at the time of the
commencement of the proceeding a proceeding concerning the custody of the
child had been previously commenced in a court of another state having
jurisdiction substantially in conformity with this chapter, unless the proceeding has been terminated or is stayed by the court of the other state because a
court of this state is a more convenient forum under Section 78-45c-207.
(2) Except as otherwise provided in Section 78-45c-204, a court of this state,
before hearing a child custody proceeding, shall examine the court documents
and other information supplied by the parties pursuant to Section 78-45c-209.
If the court determines that a child custody proceeding was previously
commenced in a court in another state having jurisdiction substantially in
accordance with this chapter, the court of this state shall stay its proceeding
and communicate with the court of the other state. If the court of the state
having jurisdiction substantially in accordance with this chapter does not
determine that the court of this state is a more appropriate forum, the court of
this state shall dismiss the proceeding.
(3) In a proceeding to modify a child custody determination, a court of this
state shall determine whether a proceeding to enforce the determination has
been commenced in another state. If a proceeding to enforce a child custody
determination has been commenced in another state, the court may:
(a) stay the proceeding for modification pending the entry of an order of
a court of the other state enforcing, staying, denying, or dismissing the
proceeding for enforcement;
(b) enjoin the parties from continuing with the proceeding for enforcement; or
(c) proceed with the modification under conditions it considers appropriate.
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-206, enacted by
U 2000, ch. 247, § 18.

Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch. 247,
§ 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Exercise of jurisdiction.
—Hearing.
Pending foreign proceeding.
—Stay of Utah action.
Proceedings elsewhere.
—Due process.

Exercise of jurisdiction.
—Hearing.
When a mother and child living in Utah
sought relief in Utah from an Ohio custody
order being enforced in Utah by her husband,
the district court erred in refusing to hold a
hearing to examine whether, under §§ 78-45c-
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14 and 78-45c-6, jurisdiction should be exercised by the Utah court. Given t h e policy considerations behind this chapter, the district
court, at the very least, should have stayed its
determination until after it held a hearing to
determine whether jurisdiction should have
been exercised. Holm v. Smilowitz, 840 P.2d 157
(Utah Ct. App. 1992).

the child's grandparents as guardians. Coppedge v. Harding, 714 P.2d 1121 (Utah 1985).
Proceedings elsewhere.
Where grandparents in Oregon, with whom
child was visiting, had won custody in Oregon
court, Utah district court w a s required to stay
parents' proceeding seeking custody determination and to communicate with Oregon court to
determine the propriety of further proceedings
in Oregon. Coppedge v. Harding, 714 P. 2d 1121
(Utah 1985).

Pending foreign proceeding.
— S t a y of U t a h action.
U t a h district court, after learning of prior
guardianship proceedings in Oregon, was required to stay a U t a h action seeking to determine child custody and to communicate with
the Oregon court to determine the propriety of
further proceedings in Oregon, so that t h e
issues could be litigated in the more appropriate forum, where the child resided in Oregon at
the time and the Oregon court h a d appointed

—Due process.
A mother was denied her due process rights
by the trial court's enforcement of a foreigncustody modification judgment which had questionable jurisdictional validity without giving
the mother reasonable notice and opportunity
to be heard. Holm v. Smilowitz, 840 P.2d 157
(Utah Ct. App. 1992).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — What types of proceedings or determinations are governed by t h e Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) or t h e
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA),
78 A.L.R.4th 1028.
Default jurisdiction of court u n d e r § (a)(4) of
the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
(UCCJA) or the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 USCS § 1738A (c)(2)(D), 6
A.L.R.5th 69.
Pending proceeding in another state as
ground for declining jurisdiction u n d e r § 6(a) of
the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
(UCCJA) or the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 USCS § 1738A(g), 20
A.L.R.5th 700.
Significant connection jurisdiction of court to
modify foreign child custody decree u n d e r

§§ 3(a)(2) and 14(b) of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28
U.S.C.A. §§ 1738A(c)(2)(b) and 1738A(f)(l), 67
A.L.R.5th 1.
Home state jurisdiction of court to modify
foreign child custody decree under §§ 3(a)(1)
and 14(a)(2) of Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) and Parental Kidnapping
Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 U.S.C.A. §§
1738A(c)(2)(A) and 1738A(f)(l), 72 A.L.R.5th
249.
Declining jurisdiction to modify prior child
custody decree under § 14(a)(1) of Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) and
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA),
28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(f)(2), 73 A.L.R.5th 185.

78-45c-207. Inconvenient forum.
(1) A court of this state that has jurisdiction under this chapter to make a
child custody determination may decline to exercise its jurisdiction at any time
if it determines that it is an inconvenient forum under the circumstances and
that a court of another state is a more appropriate forum. The issue of
inconvenient forum may be raised upon the court's own motion, request of
another court, or motion of a party.
(2) Before determining whether it is an inconvenient forum, a court of this
state shall consider whether it is appropriate that a court of another state
exercise jurisdiction. For this purpose, the court shall allow the parties to
submit information and shall consider all relevant factors, including:
(a) whether domestic violence has occurred and is likely to continue in
the future and which state could best protect the parties and the child;
(b) the length of time the child has resided outside this state;
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(c) the distance between the court in this state and the court in the state
that would assume jurisdiction;
(d) the relative financial circumstances of the parties;
(e) any agreement of the parties as to which state should assume
jurisdiction;
(f) the nature and location of the evidence required to resolve the
pending litigation, including the testimony of the child;
(g) the ability of the court of each state to decide the issue expeditiously
and the procedures necessary to present the evidence; and
(h) the familiarity of the court of each state with the facts and issues of
the pending litigation.
(3) If a court of this state determines that it is an inconvenient forum and
that a court of another state is a more appropriate forum, it shall stay the
proceedings upon condition that a child custody proceeding be promptly
commenced in another designated state and may impose any other condition
the court considers just and proper.
(4) A court of this state may decline to exercise its jurisdiction under this
chapter if a child custody determination is incidental to an action for divorce or
another proceeding while still retaining jurisdiction over the divorce or other
proceeding.
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-207, enacted by
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 19.

Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch. 247,
§ 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000.

78-45c-208. Jurisdiction declined by reason of conduct.
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Section 78-45c-204 or by other law of
this state, if a court of this state has jurisdiction under this chapter because a
person invoking the jurisdiction has engaged in unjustifiable conduct, the
court shall decline to exercise its jurisdiction unless:
(a) the parents and all persons acting as parents have acquiesced in the
exercise of jurisdiction;
(b) a court of the state otherwise having jurisdiction under Sections
78-45c-201 through 78-45c-203 determines that this state is a more
appropriate forum under Section 78-45c-207; or
(c) no other state would have jurisdiction under Sections 78-45c-201
through 78-45c-203.
(2) If a court of this state declines to exercise its jurisdiction pursuant to
Subsection (1), it may fashion an appropriate remedy to ensure the safety of
the child and prevent a repetition of the wrongful conduct, including staying
the proceeding until a child custody proceeding is commenced in a court having
jurisdiction under Sections 78-45c-201 through 78-45c-203.
(3) If a court dismisses a petition or stays a proceeding because it declines
to exercise its jurisdiction pursuant to Subsection (1), it shall charge the party
invoking the jurisdiction of the court with necessary and reasonable expenses
including costs, communication expenses, attorney's fees, investigative fees,
expenses for witnesses, travel expenses, and child care during the course of the
proceedings, unless the party from whom fees are sought establishes that the
award would be clearly inappropriate. The court may not assess fees, costs, or
expenses against this state except as otherwise provided by law other than this
chapter.
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History: C. 1953, 78-45c-208, enacted by
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 20.

Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch. 247,
§ 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000. '

78-45e-209. Information to be submitted to court.
(1) In a child custody proceeding, each party, in its first pleading or in an
attached affidavit, shall give information, if reasonably ascertainable, under
oath as to the child's present address, the places where the child has lived
during the last five years, and the names and present addresses of the persons
with whom the child has lived during that period. The pleading or affidavit
shall state whether the party:
(a) has participated, as a party or witness or in any other capacity, in
any other proceeding concerning the custody of or parent-time with the
child and, if so, identify the court, the case number of the proceeding, and
the date of the child custody determination, if any;
(b) knows of any proceeding that could affect the current proceeding,
including proceedings for enforcement and proceedings relating to domestic violence, protective orders, termination of parental rights, and adoptions and, if so, identify the court and the case number and the nature of
the proceeding; and
(c) knows the names and addresses of any person not a party to the
proceeding who has physical custody of the child or claims rights of legal
custody or physical custody of, or parent-time with, the child and, if so, the
names and addresses of those persons.
(2) If the information required by Subsection (1) is not furnished, the court,
upon its own motion or that of a party, may stay the proceeding until the
information is furnished.
(3) If the declaration as to any of the items described in Subsection (1) is in
the affirmative, the declarant shall give additional information under oath as
required by the court. The court may examine the parties under oath as to
details of the information furnished and other matters pertinent to the court's
jurisdiction and the disposition of the case.
(4) Each party has a continuing duty to inform the court of any proceeding
in this or any other state that could affect the current proceeding.
(5) If a party alleges in an affidavit or a pleading under oath that the health,
safety, or liberty of a party or child would be put at risk by the disclosure of
identifying information, that information shall be sealed and not disclosed to
the other party or the public unless the court orders the disclosure to be made
after a hearing in which the court takes into consideration the health, safety,
or liberty of the party or child and determines that the disclosure is in the
interest of justice.
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-209, enacted by
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 21; 2001, ch. 255, § 37.
Amendment Notes. — The 2001 amendment, effective April 30, 2001, substituted "par-

exit-time" for "visitation" in Subsections (l)(a)
and (c).
Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch. 247,
§ 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000.

78-45c-210. Appearance of parties and child.
(1) A court of this state may order a party to a child custody proceeding who
is in this state to appear before the court personally with or without the child.
The court may order any person who is in this state and who has physical
custody or control of the child to appear physically with the child.
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MARK ALLEN SULLIVAN,

) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
) Hamilton County.

Petitioner-Appellant

)

v.

) No. 03-F-5

WENDY SULLIVAN,

) Honorable
) Barry L. Vaughan,
) Judge, presiding.

Respondent-Appellee.

R U L E 23 O R D E R
Petitioner, Mark Sullivan, appeals the denial of his motion to reconsider the order
entered by the circuit court of Hamilton County setting aside a preliminary injunction that
gave him temporary custody of the parties' children. The appeal is pursuant to Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 307(a)(1) (188 111. 2d R. 307(a)(1)). We affirm.
Mark Sullivan and Wendy Sullivan, respondent, were married on August 26, 1995,
in Albuquerque, New Mexico. During the course of their marriage, two children were born
of the parties, namely: Brett Vernon Sullivan, bom April 2,1996, and Sydney June Sullivan,
bom July 18, 1997. The parties became residents of Illinois in December 1999 and resided
in West Frankfort, Franklin County, Illinois. In June 2001, they moved to Thompsonville,
Hamilton County, Illinois. In June 2002, Wendy took the children to Utah to visit her
family, and according to Mark, she notified him on July 2 that she was not returning to
Illinois and intended to terminate the parties' marriage.
On September 26, 2002, Wendy filed in Utah a complaint for the dissolution of the
parties' marriage and for the custody of the children. On December 26,2002, Mark entered

1

his appearance and moved to dismiss the Utah proceedings. On January 28, 2003, Wendy
opened a new file in Utah and? for a second time, filed for the dissolution of the parties'
marriage and for the custody of the children On April 7, 2003, Mark filed a petition for the
custody of the children in Hamilton County, Illinois, and on April 22, he filed an answer and
objection to jurisdiction in the second dissolution proceeding initiated by Wendy in Utah.
On May 5, 2003, Wendy entered her pro se appearance in the Illinois action filed by Mark.
Wendy also filed an answer in which she stated that she had previously filed a complaint for
the dissolution of the marriage and for the custody of the children in Davis County, Utah, in
January 2003. On May 15,2003, Utah judge Honorable Darwin C.Hansen granted Wendy's
motion to dismiss her original complaint. On August 7, 2003, Judge Hansen denied Mark's
request to reinstate Wendy's original complaint and to consolidate it with her second
complaint for dissolution. Judge Hansen also found that Utah had jurisdiction to decide the
dissolution and custody issues presented and referred the case to a commissioner for further
proceedings. Judge Hansen's decision determining that Utahhad jurisdiction over this matter
is currently pending before the Utah Court of Appeals (Sullivan v. Sullivan, No. 20030957
(docketed November 26, 2003)).
On November 13, 2003, a hearing was conducted before Commissioner David S.
DiJlion pertaining to the custody of the parties' children, child support, and visitation.
Wendy was present and was represented by counsel. Mark was not present but was
represented by counsel. On December 5, 2003, the Utah court entered an order granting
Wendy temporary custody of the minor children and granting Mark visitation during the
Christmas season, Mark exercised his right to visitation pursuant to the Utah order and
returned the children to Illinois. While the children were still in Illinois, Mark filed an ex
parte emergency petition for temporary custody in the State of Illinois.

Judge Barry

Vaughan found that Utah's temporary custody order was not entitled to full faith and credit,
2

because Utah did not have proper jurisdiction over the child custody issue in the case. As
a result, the court granted the ex parte request and scheduled the hearing on the preliminary
injunction for January 5,2004. On Januaiy 2,2004, Wendy was served with the petition and
a notice of the hearing. On Januaiy 5,2004, Wendy was found in default, and a preliminary
injunction was entered granting Mark temporary custody of the children.
On Januaiy 8, 2004, counsel in Utah for Wendy and Mark arranged for a telephone
conference between Judge Hansen and Judge Vaughan pursuant to section 7(c) of the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (Act):
"If the court is informed during the course of the proceeding that a proceeding
concerning the custody of the child was pending in another state before the court
assumed jurisdiction^] it shall stay the proceeding and communicate with the court
in which the other proceeding is pending to the end that the issue may be litigated in
the more appropriate forum and that infonnation be exchanged in accordance with
Sections 20 through 23 of this Act. If a court of this State has made a custody
judgment before being informed of a pending proceeding in a court of another statefj
it shdl immediately inform that court of the fact If the court is informed that a
proceeding was commenced in another state after it assumed jurisdiction^] it shall
likewise inform the other court to the end that the issues may be litigated in the most
appropriate forum." 750 LLCS 35/7(c) (West 2002).l
l

Thc Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act has since been repealed and replaced,

effective January 1,2004, by the Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act
(Pub. Act 93-108, art. 1, §§101,404, efif. January 1, 2004 (repealing 750ILCS 35/1 elseg.
and adding 750 ILCS 361101 at seq.)). Motions or other requests for relief made in childcustody proceedings or to enforce child-custody determinations that had been commenced
before the effective date of the new act are governed by the law in effect at the time the
3

After the telephone conference, Judge Vaughan made the following entry in the case
record sheet:
"Court receives telephone call @ 4:30 p.m.fromJudge Darwin C. Hanson [sic], 2*
Judicial District, Utah; a record of the proceedings was made by Judge Hansen; judges
discuss jurisdictional issues & fact of two contrary terapforary] cust[ody] orders;
teleconference per 75 [sic] ILCS 35/§§ 7 & 8; judges agree that Illinois court will stay
per § 7 its proceedings pending decision from Utah Appellate Court. Preliminary
injunction entered granting temporary custody to father is vacated effective 1-12-04
at noon per § 7(c). In staying these proceedings, the IL & UT courts agree that the
appeal pending in Utah is controlling; the IL court is not declining jurisdiction nor [sic]
conceding jurisdiction but deferring to the Utah Appellate Court; there is no question
Utah has jurisdiction over the dissolution proceedings; Utah had a temporary custody
order in place at the time the IL temporary] custody was entered; the court is also
troubled by [the] fact Mark f(]husband[)] did not file a custody action in IL until 4-703, 9 months after wife left, 6 months after wife filed proceedings in Utah, & 4
month[sJ after husband filed an answer in Utah; had husband filed custody in IL
sooner, there is no question IL would be the home state; at this point in the
proceedings Judge Vaughan & Judge Hansen agree this is a matter best left to the Utah
court of appeals."
The Act was adopted in both Illinois and Utah. 750 ILCS 35/1 et seq. (West 2002);
Utah Code Ann, §78-45c-101 et seq. (2002). The Act seeks to avoid jurisdictional
competitions and conflicts between states, to protect children's best interests, and to
discourage forum shopping. In re Marriage ofRizza, 231 [11. App. 3d 83, 87, 603 N.E.2d
134, 138 (1992). Accordingly, the Act achieves certainty by providing that the first state to
motions or other requests were made.
4

exercise jurisdiction has the exclusive right to proceed. In re Marriage o/Kneitz, 341 111.
App. 3d 299,304,793 N.E.2d 988,993 (2003); see also In re Marriage ofludwinski, 329 111.
App. 3d 1149, 1154, 769 N.E 2d 1094, 1099 (2002). Specifically, section 7(a) of the Act
provides as follows:
"A court of this State shall not exercise its jurisdiction under this Act if at the time of
filing the petition a proceeding concerning the custody of the child was pending in a
court of another state exercising jurisdiction substantially in conformity with this Act,
unless the proceeding is stayed by the court of the other state because this State is a
more appropriate forum or for other reasons." 750ILCS 35/7(a) (West 2002).
Similarly, section 14 states:
"The courts of this State shall recognize and enforce an initial or modification
judgment of a court of another state which had assumed jurisdiction under statutory
provisions substantially in accordance with this Act or which was made under factual
circumstances meeting the jurisdictional standards of the Act, so long as this judgment
has not been modified in accordance with jurisdictional standards substantially similar
to those of this Act." 750 ILCS 35/14 (West 2002).
Before resolving this matter, it is important to identify what is and what is not before
the court. The limited issue raised in this appeal is whether the trial court enred in dissolving
the preliminary injunction it had previously entered. Controverted facts or the merits of the
case are not decided where, as hcrcf an interlocutory appeal is brought pursuant to Supreme
Court Rule 307(a)(1) (188 III. 2d R. 307(a)(1)). Yates v. Doctor's Associates, Inc., 193 HI.
App. 3d 431, 437, 549 N.E.2d 1010, 1014 (1990). The only issue in such an appeal is
"whether there was a sufficient showing to sustain the order of the trial court granting or
denying the relief sought" Yates, 193 111. App. 3d at 437, 549 N,E.2d at 1014; see also
Caudle v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 245 111. App. 3d 959, 962, 614 N.E.2d 1312, 1315-16

5

(1993).
Mark frames the issue as follows: "Whether the Illinois circuit court erred in deferring
subject matter jurisdiction to the.State of Utah?" The court did not decline subject matter
jurisdiction in the case. If it had, Mark's petition would have been dismissed. The court
specifically found that Illinois was "not declining jurisdiction nor [sic] conceding jurisdiction"
to Utah. Judge Vaughan decided to wait until the Utah appellate court decided Mark's appeal
of the Utah trial judge's decision regarding jurisdiction. We believe that Judge Vaughan's
actions were consistent with the general puipose of the Act:
"to avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict with courts of other States in child
custody matters; [to] promote cooperation with the courts of other States; [to] assure
that child custody litigation occurs in the State where the child and his or her family
has the closest connection, and where evidence of the child's care, protection,
trainingf,] and personal relationships is most readily available; to discourage
controversies over child custody matters; to deter abductions; and to avoid relitigation
of child custody decisions of other States." Richardson v. Richardson, 255 HI App.
3d 1099, 1100-01, 625 N.E.2d 1122, U23 (1993).
Mark wisely appealed the Utah trial judge's ruling on jurisdiction. If he had failed to
appeal the Utah decision, he would not be able to argue in Illinois that the Utah trial court had
erred on the jurisdictional issue. See In re Marriage ofArulpragasam & Eisele, 304 111. App.
3d 139, 146, 709N.E.2d 725, 731 (1999); In re Marriage ofMauro, 187111. App. 3d 794,
797,543 N.E.2d 856, 858 (1989), We also find that the Illinois trial judge in this case made
a sound decision in vacating the preliminary injunction and effectively staying the Illinois
action until the Utah appellate court renders a decision on Mark's appeal. We agree that this
was the most effective and efficient way to fulfill the purpose of the Act.
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Affinned.
• u tinPKTMS and WELCH, JJ-. concurring.
PONOVAN, J., with HOPKINS ana w *

7

